Trump Signal IndexReporting on March 28 indicated that US military planning for potential ground operations in the Hormuz region had centered on seven specific islands — a detail that transforms the Hormuz confrontation from an air campaign into something with the potential for sustained territorial control. The islands, located across the strait between Iranian and Omani/UAE waters, command the narrow navigable channels through which tanker traffic must pass.
“Any effort to guarantee freedom of navigation in Hormuz over the long term requires controlling the high ground — and in a maritime strait, the high ground is the islands. There are seven that matter.
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The islands identified in planning documents reportedly include Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb — three islands currently administered by Iran but claimed by the UAE — along with four additional positions straddling the main shipping lanes. Control of these positions would allow the US or a US-backed force to enforce open transit physically, rather than relying solely on naval presence.
Why Islands Matter in a Strait
The Strait of Hormuz at its narrowest is approximately 33 kilometers wide, but the navigable deepwater channel for large tankers is far narrower — roughly two 3-kilometer-wide lanes separated by a median. The islands that sit along or near these lanes are natural choke points: whoever controls them controls the ability to monitor, tax, or block transit.
Iran has used Abu Musa and the Tunbs as forward positions for IRGC naval operations for decades. The islands host radar installations, fast-attack boat facilities, and missile batteries that give Iran the ability to threaten tankers throughout the strait. Neutralizing these positions would significantly degrade Iran's Hormuz interdiction capability even if Iran's mainland military remained intact.
The Ground Operations Dimension
Air campaigns can destroy installations but cannot hold territory. If the US objective is durable Hormuz security — as Trump's "we're going to make money from Hormuz" framing suggests — that eventually requires physical presence on or near the islands. This is a qualitatively different commitment than a strike campaign.
Ground operations in the islands would require amphibious assault capability, sustained logistics, and an answer to the question of what happens after the islands are taken — who administers them, under what legal framework, and for how long. The UAE's territorial claims over Abu Musa and the Tunbs create a potential partner for post-conflict administration, but that arrangement would require delicate diplomatic handling.
Market Implications of a Ground Dimension
Markets have been pricing the Iran confrontation as an air campaign with a defined end state. A ground operations dimension — even a limited island-seizure scenario — introduces a much longer timeline, higher costs, and greater uncertainty about resolution. That changes the risk premium calculation for oil substantially.
An air campaign that ends in weeks is one scenario. A ground presence in Hormuz that commits US forces for months or years is a fundamentally different market environment — one with persistently elevated geopolitical risk embedded in energy prices regardless of whether a formal deal is reached.