Trump Signal Index
On October 13 Trump warned Yemen’s Houthi rebels that he will deal with them after the midterms.
The Houthis are behaving very badly, he wrote on Truth Social. A year ago, he said, the US bombed them hard and stopped when they asked, and he thought they had learned their lesson. They stayed quiet for a long time. Now they are back, attacking Saudi Arabia in a vicious way.
His explanation is Iran. The Houthis are probably acting on Tehran’s orders, he wrote, to drive oil prices up on purpose before the US election. He described Iran as a failed state with perhaps no navy or air force, the world’s worst economy, and 301% inflation.
Then the warning. Someone should explain to the Houthis, he wrote, that he is not running in this election. He will still be there after it, and he will never forget.
Everything Waits for November 3
Trump has said he will not strike Iran at any point before the November 3 midterms. The New York Times reports he has turned down plans for large-scale military operations against Iran or the Houthis five times in recent months.
That sits next to The Atlantic’s report a week ago that the White House asked the Pentagon for Iran strike options usable before the vote. Both can be true: asking for options is not using them. But the public line is now firm. No US strikes before November 3.
The list of things scheduled for after that date keeps growing:
- The Iran war’s end: “probably right after the midterms,” Trump told an Alabama rally on October 2
- A bombing campaign: likely after the midterms, according to aides quoted by the Wall Street Journal
- The Houthis: retaliation, after the election
The message has also shifted. On October 4 Trump told voters, “I am the candidate on this ballot.” That post was for supporters. The October 13 version, that he is not on the ballot, is for Iran and its allies: the vote will not remove him.
Someone Else’s Fight
Asked at the White House whether he would ask Turkey to join attacks on the Houthis, Trump said he might. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a very good friend, he said. He believes Erdogan will do what he asks, and he respects him greatly.
Axios reported that Syria is weighing sending troops against the Houthis, and that the administration does not object.
The candidates are unusual. Turkey has NATO’s second-largest military, but no border with Yemen and no history of fighting the Houthis. Syria’s government under Ahmed al-Sharaa took power after Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024, which gives Damascus its own reasons to oppose Iran’s network in the region.
A month ago, the US was the one being asked. In Dublin on September 12, Trump refused Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s request for US strikes on the Houthis. “They asked us not to get involved,” he said of the Houthis. “They don’t want to fight us.”
Why Saudi Arabia Matters Now
With Hormuz running at about a third of its pre-war volume, Saudi Arabia’s main way around it is the East-West pipeline, which carries crude to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. An attack halted that pipeline in September, and Trump said Iran was “probably” behind it. Yanbu and the Red Sea shipping lanes sit within the Houthis’ reach.
Trump did not say what the Houthis have hit. But the Saudi export routes that bypass Hormuz are the ones the Houthis are best placed to threaten.
Take Trump’s own explanation at face value: Iran is using the Houthis to lift oil prices before the US election. Then the response he announced has a timing problem. Deterrence works when the cost arrives before the payoff. Here, the payoff Trump describes — higher oil before November 3 — comes first, and the promised cost comes after. Announcing that the US will not act for three weeks tells Tehran and the Houthis how long the window stays open. Asking Turkey or Syria to step in is an attempt to close it without American strikes. Neither has said yes, and neither is positioned to protect Saudi Red Sea exports quickly.
The Other Side
Holding fire has a case. In this war, oil has generally risen when US strikes resumed after a pause, according to Energy Information Administration data cited by The Atlantic. A pre-election strike could push prices up, not down. Getting regional states to carry more of the burden has been a US goal for years. And the 2025 campaign showed the threat is real. US strikes that began in March 2025 ended Houthi attacks on American ships in about seven weeks, through a deal brokered by Oman. The promise to remember keeps that option open without committing US forces during an election.
For oil, the pre-election window now has a clear shape. US strikes on Iran or the Houthis are off the table until November 3, which removes one source of a US-driven price spike. It also leaves Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia unanswered for three weeks, at the routes that carry Saudi crude around Hormuz. That supports the Red Sea risk premium, tanker insurance costs, and shipping rates through Bab el-Mandeb. After November 3, event risk clusters: the promised end of the Iran war, a possible bombing campaign, and now Houthi retaliation. Watch for Houthi strikes on Yanbu or Red Sea tankers, Saudi export data, Erdogan’s answer to Trump, and any Syrian deployment. A Turkish yes would add a NATO member to a Gulf conflict. A no would leave the gap until the vote.
The Threat (Oct 13)
Houthis to face consequences after the election; Trump will never forget
His Explanation
Iran is directing them to raise oil before the US vote
The Pledge
No strike on Iran before November 3
NYT
Large-scale Iran/Houthi plans turned down 5 times in recent months
The Outsourcing
Turkey might be asked; Syria weighing troops (Axios)
Sept 12
Trump refused Saudi Arabia’s request for US strikes on the Houthis